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Constitution, Continuity and the
legacy of Dictatorship:
25 years of the Pinochet coup
Rosa Martinez & Alan Bradshaw
The Pinochet Coup
In this paper we focus on the formal constitutional mechanisms of the
1980s and 1990s by which the Chilean military dictatorship, and those
economic and social forces allied to the military, continued the form of society
which they had dramatically created in the 1970s. Our article is thus a social,
political and economic commentary on the formal provisions of a
constitution. l We offer the caveat that this article does not claim to elucidate,
via a study of Chile, how all dictatorships might tend to retain influence after
the return to formal democracy. Nor are we concerned here with General
Pinochet's recent detention in London. 2
This article examines, then, how one dictatorship maintained what it
valued as its social and economic gains when the dictatorship ended and there
was a passage from dictatorship to formal parliamentary democracy. The
dictatorship in question is the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. General
Pinochet with fellow generals and admirals seized power in Chile a quarter of
a century ago, on 11 September 1973, so overthrowing the elected President
Salvador Allende. In 1989, having lost a presidential plebiscite in 1988,
Pinochet allowed a return to substantial parliamentary democracy and a proper
The Chilean constitution is easily consulted via the internet at http://www.congreso.cl
When this paper was first drafted, in late September 1998, the trajectory of Chilean politics had
long since ceased to engage social and legal commentators in the English-speaking world. The
brief history contained here was largely neglected, if not forgotten. The unexpected detention of
Pinochet in London in mid October 1998, following an extradition request by the Spanish
investigating magistrate Garzon, suddenly brought Pinochet and Chile back to prominence. Our
article is not concerned with the technicalities of prosecutions for international human rights
violations, nor with immunity claims, nor with extradition procedures. Whatever the personal
outcome in Europe for Pinochet, Chile remains in a strong sense Pinochet's Chile, economically
and politically. This article concerns the constitution of that Chile.
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presidential election. Pinochet then remained as head of the Chilean armed
forces until early 1998, continuing to have much political influence. Chile has
had, therefore, 25 years of General Pinochet. The title of our paper describes
'25 years afthe Pinochet coup', not 25 years after the Pinochet coup. The
burden of this paper is that through the 1980 Pinochet constitution the special
economic dimension of the 1973 military coup has been sustained.
A Special Revolt
Although there are not necessarily wide generalisations that can be
drawn from the recent history of Chile, the Chilean case is worthy of study
beyond Latin America for many reasons. First among these reasons, the
military coup against the elected Allende government was a highly
international event. The coup was partly inspired by and was aggressively
supported by the United States of America. The coup prompted widespread
foreign criticism and boycotts over many years. Not least, the nature of the
coup precipitated over a million Chileans into forced or voluntary exile (from
a total population of less than 15 millions).3 Secondly, the coup was a
politically extraordinary event. Chile during 150 years previous to the
Pinochet coup had remained very far from being an unstable banana republic
prone to palace COUpS.4 Chile had sustained a long tradition of parliamentary
democratic forms, even if tempered by various forms of internal oppression,
most notably against the Indians in the South. 5 Thirdly, the Pinochet regime
gained notoriety for its initial slaughter of political opponents and its later
sustained campaigns of disappearance and torture against citizens. Fourthly,
and most important from a sociological point of view, the coup became much
more than a coup against supposedly malevolent and misguided socialist
politicians who were leading the country to ruin. To the surprise and chagrin
of traditional right-wing parliamentary politicians (who expected to see the
military hand power back to them after a short delay), the army sustained for
For a poignant account of exile and return, see for example Garcia Marquez, Gabriel (1987)
Clandestine in Chile, Granta Books, Cambridge.
Eyzaguin'e, Jaime (1967) Historia de las instituciones politicos Y sociales de Chile, Editorial
Universitaria, Santiago de Chile
Pendle, George (1963) A History ofLatin America, Penguin, Harmondsworth
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years a military government largely excluding traditional landed and industrial
interests. Even more, the military coup became the vehicle for a
thoroughgoing economic revolution, a revolution that went against traditional
right-wing economic and social prescription. This economic revolution has
had profound social consequences for Chile, haIting and reversing many of the
social and economic tendencies of the previous 50 or even 100 years.
Moreover, the Chilean economic revolution had important demonstration
consequences for Britain. 6
The Economic Coup
The Chilean laissez-faire economic revolution conducted under
Pinochet was the revolution of neoliberal Chicago economics - free trade
ambitions, the end of protectionism. (Contrast, for example, the autarchy and
protection espoused by Franco's military coup in Spain in 1936.) Since 1973,
exposed to world competition, many small uncompetitive Chilean industries
(eg car assembly) have been swept away, Chile has returned to being, as it
was until the First World War, an economy of extractive and agricultural
exports (eg copper, timber, salmon, fruit, wine). The military iron fist
permitted the imposition of a neoliberal economy of privatisation, low tariff
barriers, consequent exposure to world competition, the retreat of state welfare
schemes, the suppression and later containment of trade union activity, the
growth of economic inequalities. Many of these themes became the themes
of Margaret Thatcher's 1979 UK government. Since Chile had become
something of a 'pure' laboratory for monetarist Chicago neoliberal economics
just a few years earlier, the references to Chile as a model were explicit in the
Thatcher government.? Thanks to the military repression of dissent, the
Pinochet dictatorship was able to implement neoliberal economic policies
swiftly, directly and thoroughly.8 The Thatcher government, though radical
and determined, had to proceed more cautiously.
In the early 1980s Margaret Thatcher's ministers explicitly quoted the Chilean
neoliberal experiment as a model for the British economy.
See Cecil Parkinson's interview as Trade Secretary in the Santiago newspaper £1 Mercurio,
Weekly Report section, October 1980.
For a thorough account of ideology and practice up to 1983, sec Latin !unerica Bureau (1983)
Chile: The Pinoche! Decade, Latin !unerica Bureau, London.
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In broad terms, the Pinochet coup's policies represent the marriage of
American National Security Doctrine (internal and external war against
international communist subversion) with the monetarism of Chicago School
economics, and the general intellectual tenor of Friedrich von Hayek and
Milton Friedman. Hayek had emerged post-World War II as an early and
forceful critic of the Keynesian state interventionism (in economic affairs) that
became the conventional wisdom of western capitalist economies. Hayek
regarded Keynesian state intervention as The Road to Serfdom, the title of his
1944 attack on the state management of capitalism. For Hayek, Keynesianism
represented moral decline, retreat from the rule of law, decline of belief in
private property and competitive markets. Hayek regarded Keynesianism as
inherently and blatantly inflationary, whereas Latin American Keynesian
thought of the 1950s and 1960s considered inflation within the continent to
be the result of basic structural economic weaknesses.
Hayek and Friedman contributed to making the University of Chicago
a centre of laissez-faire economics that combatted state sponsorship of
industrialisation. A core belief of the Chicago School is that inflation is a
monetary phenomenon produced entirely by demand and money supply.
Hayek's The Constitution ofLiberty also claims that economic liberty is more
basic than political liberty; economic liberty for Hayek is philosophically prior
to political freedoms. Hayek also observes in his work that democracy can
acquire totalitarian powers, and that authoritarian governments can behave
according to liberal principles.
Hayek's stance is that even mild inflation cannot be tolerated since it
will lead to much worse. In his view, the economically stimulating effect of
inflation can only be maintained by accelerating it. Thus, mild inflation leads
to rampant inflation. The only question for Hayek is therefore whether to stop
inflation gradually or via a sudden 'shock' treatment. The short 'shock' of
government intervening to kill inflation by withdrawing from economic
activity and by ending barriers to free market competition is likely to produce
high unemployment - higher than that produced by gradual economic reform.
However, a gradual 2-3 year attack on inflation is in Hayek's view beyond the
capacity of most democratic governments since the high rate of unemployment
over several years demanded by any anti-inflationary structural reform would
be likely to destroy the government responsible for the policy.
Chilean industrial development had been largely state sponsored, ie of
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the type routinely disliked by Hayek as being inflationary and inefficient.
Chicago School economics became influential in academic circles in Chile
from 1955 onwards, the Chilean laissez-faire economists of the Catholic
University of Santiago coming to be known as the 'Chicago boys'9 Despite
strong links with business in the decade prior to the coup, the 'Chicago boys'
were regarded by the conventional right wing and by national capitalists as
being too extreme. They were seen as advancing ideas unsuited for
implementation within a democracy.
The arrival of the military dictatorship in 1973 therefore offered a novel
laboratory for the implementation of Chicago ideas. And the 'Chicago boys'
offered the military the confident economic plan which the generals lacked,
the generals having been against President Allende's policies rather thanfor
traditional right wing policies favoured by civilian politicians. After some
hesitations the coup accepted Chicago theories.
Friedrich von Hayek, and his colleague Milton Friedman were both
immensely and directly influential in Chile following the coup. Hayek and
Friedman visited Chile to support their pupils in the work of reforming the
Chilean economy and Chilean society. Friedman's monetarism and Hayek's
assault on inflation were both championed by the economists who came to
dominate the policies of the dictatorship in a rapid process of displacement of
economists of other persuasions. Hayek advised for Chile the 'shock'
deflation which he later advised Mrs Thatcher for Britain.
The shock treatment implemented by the Chicago economists in 1975-
76 was intended to alter structures and expectations for ever. Above all, state
expenditure to keep the economy going was to be abandoned. Chile was to
face its economic problems (high cost ofoil, halving of the value of traditional
copper exports) by increasing non-traditional exports rather than by seeking
an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. Friedman rejected the view that
Chile's problems were external impositions created by sudden changes in
international terms of trade. He believed Chile's problems were home
manufactured, and that with the necessary unpleasant medicine unemployment
was inevitable. However, a short sharp shock could, with temporary
unemployment, transform economic prospects. State expenditure was to be
cut by 20%. An end had to be sought to increases in the supply of money
Latin America Bureau, op cil.
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outstripping increases in production.
Pinochet accepted Friedman's prescriptions. At the personal level,
appeals to the need for single-minded disciplined policies appealed to
Pinochet's self-image. It also suited the dictator of Chile, an increasingly
isolated country politically and economically, not to have to depend on foreign
loans. Chicago policies also conveniently resulted in the marginalisation of
the air force generals who had been inclined to support more orthodox and/or
gradualist policies.
In 1975 government expenditure was accordingly cut by 27%. Tax
receipts and inflation both rose, then fell. Chilean gross national product
(GNP) fell by 16.6%. Many industries disappeared. Wages fell in 1975 to
half their value of 1970. In early 1976 official unemployment rose to 28%.
The social security system was breaking down, partly as a result of bankrupt
firms defaulting on social security payments. The minimum wage in the
country was driven down. With lower wage costs, productivity rose steeply.
The collapse of internal markets forced producers to find new markets abroad.
Trade tariffs were cut, banks privatised, economic power increasingly
concentrated in the hands oflarge finance companies. By mid-1976, when the
'shock' officially ended, three key Keynesian institutions were severely
weakened - a controlling state, a well-organised and influential labour
movement, and tariff walls between the national economy and world
economy. All but 15 of 507 state firms had been privatised. By the end of
1978 Chile's average tariff barrier against imports stood at only 10% - lower
even than during the most liberal 19th-century period.
Hayek and the New Constitution: 'The Constitution of Liberty'
By the end of the 1980s the product ofneoliberallaissez-jaire economic
policies in both Britain and Chile was that both were countries where extremes
of wealth and poverty had been sharpened, where the welfare state had
retreated, where job insecurities had been heightened. Following the analysis
of Andrew Gamble,lO (he sees British political economy as a historic struggle
between the free trade needs of big international capital and the protectionist
wishes of national small and medium capital), in Margaret Thatcher's Britain
10 Gamble, Andrew (1994), Britain in Decline, Macmillan, London
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international capital won the political struggle and achieved policies
supporting its interests. By the end ofthe 1980s much the same had happened
in Chile under the Pinochet regime. I I Pinochet had established an economic
framework in which international capital dominated. Locally generated
medium and small capital suffered.
However, by the end of the 1980s both the UK Thatcher government
and the Pinochet regime in Chile had generated economic difficulties and
more general political problems that undermined the respective governments.
Chile, for example, had suffered an enormous banking crisis in the 1980s.
The Conservatives in Britain solved their problems by rejecting
Thatcher for a new Prime Minister, Major, so retaining power until 1997.
Pinochet's response to his political problems was to step down as President,
but to remain as head of the armed forces. Pinochet lost the plebiscite of 1988
in which he hoped to be endorsed as President for a further eight years. In
fact, the apparent constitutional position of Pinochet had already changed
substantially since the coup. Pinochet passed from being the treacherous/
liberating general of the 1970s (the characterisation depending on your point
of view), to a constitutional head of state in the 1980s. Of course, throughout
the Pinochet years of government Pinochet combined the roles of head of state
and head of the armed forces. Although Pinochet introduced a new
constitution with parliamentary elements (endorsed by a plebiscite in 1980,
and planned originally to come into effect in March 1989), this was always
effectively backed by use of force. Significantly, the Pinochet constitution of
1980 was titled 'The Constitution of Liberty', a direct reference to the treatise
of the same title by Hayek, 12 the work in which individual economic freedoms
are seen as being more fundamental and important than political freedoms.
When the Pinochet regime borrowed the title of Hayek's 1960 book as the
name for its proposed constitution, 'The Constitution of Liberty', Hayek did
not complain.
Pinochet's 1980 Constitution of Liberty remains the basis of Chilean
political life, although modified by the discussions that led to Pinochet's
removal from the Presidency in 1989. The Constitution of Liberty put
Pinochet on the road to perpetuating his new neoliberal society beyond the
11
12
Moulian. Tomas (1997), Chile actual: anatomia de un mito, Arcis, Santiago de Chile
Hayek, FA (1960), The Constitution a/Liberty, RKP, London
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years of terror into a decade in which there were some superficial returns to
democracy. The 1980 constitution combined the ideologies of laissez-faire
and 'national security' (US cold war political concerns). On the latter theme,
for instance, the Communist Party was proscribed. There were, however,
limited democratic elements in the 1980 constitution. A new congress was
eventually to be established, for instance, but it was marginalised away from
the capital, Santiago, to the fascinating but disintegrating working-class port
of Valparaiso. Pinochet needed a 'proper' constitution, partly because of
international distaste for his regime. Even the United States, ally and
promoter of the 1973 coup, had lost patience with Pinochet when he arranged
to have an exiled Allende minister, Letelier, assassinated in 1976 on United
States territory. 13
Discussion in Dictatorship: The double negotiation of the constitution
There were two phases of negotiation of the present Chilean constitution
- the original formulation culminating in the 1981 constitutional plebiscite,
and the limited renegotiation following Pinochet's defeat in the 1988
succession referendum. The construction ofthe present constitution therefore
spans over a decade - from the late 1970s until 1990. The four periods of the
constitution are thus: (1) constitution created during the military dictatorship
to serve the ends of the regime; (2) planned period of gradual implementation
during the 1980s; (3) defeat of Pinochet in the 1988 succession plebiscite,
followed by partial renegotiation, 1989 elections, and change of presidency in
1990; (4) formal democracy within an unchanged constitution, and the
maintenance of the economic structures created by Pinochet. Until March
1998, it must be remembered, Pinochet remained as head of the armed forces.
Chile has thus passed from coup and dictatorship to 'constitutional
dictatorship' (the 1980s) to formal (partial) democracy (the 1990s).
Why and how was this process of constitutional construction
accomplished? First, we return to the original needs of the dictatorship in the
years after the 1973 coup. The constitutional debate of these years is described
in detail in Chile actual: anatomia de un mito. /4 In the latter half of the 1970s
13
14
Latin America Bureau, op cit.
Moulian, op cit.
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the Pinochet dictatorship lacked both internal and external legitimacy.
Internal dissent continued, exiles pressed from abroad, and international
disapproval - expressed in material boycotts - weighed heavily on the regime.
In 1976 there was open internal trade union opposition, even from right wing
Christian Democrats. In 1977 Pinochet found it expedient to ban all political
parties. The UK withdrew its ambassador in 1975 following the torture of the
British doctor Sheila Cassidy, and the US government was scandalised by the
1976 Letelier murder in Washington. Until 1981, just after the plebiscite
which endorsed the 1980 constitutional" proposals, the United States
maintained restrictions on government finance for Chile. This was serious for
the regime. It must be remembered that the USA had originally promoted the
1973 coup.
Hence the last years of the 1970s were marked by a growing
legitimation crisis, all the more acute internally because of the economic pain
created by the 1975-76 'shock' measures of the Chicago School economists.
In response to the legitimation crisis Pinochet ordered the preparation
of a new constitution. The first plans were published in late 1978 by a
Constitutional Commission. These then passed through the Council of State
(Consejo de Estado), and the subsequently revised version then went to the
military junta. The Constitutional Commission's original plan was for a
'protected democracy' with a strong executive, a two-chamber Parliament, a
politically influential and autonomous military, and a ban on totalitarian
political doctrines (communism)15 Importantly, the new economic neoliberal
structures were to be constitutionally protected; there was to be an independent
Central Bank, and restrictions on trade union activity. Finally, the constitution
would be difficult to amend once in place. When the original constitutional
plan passed through the Council of State various changes were made. It was
at this stage that the idea of a transition period was introduced. The changes
at this stage generally reflected conservative civilian thought. Constitutional
amendment was made easier. In broad terms, in the Council's revisions
15 Article 8 of the 1980 Constitution of Liberty did indeed make the Communist Party illegal.
However, in 1989, the year of the first presidential elections, Article 8 was abolished, so making
the Communist Party legal once more. Opposition forces, including right wing parties, reached a
broad agreement to reincorporate the Communists into conventional political life. Interestingly,
however, despite the opening up of political life, there has been no return to a radical SOCIalist
agenda in the 1990s - neither the Socialist Party, nor the Communists, have regained the radical
energies of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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presidential and property rights were increased; citizen and military rights
were reduced in comparison with the Commission original.
In its tum the military junta revised the revisions of the Council of State,
generally reversing any proto-revision that might weaken Pinochet's chances
of continuing for as long as he wanted as President. In the version of the
constitution finally submitted to popular referendum on 11 September 1980
(the seventh anniversary of the coup), the role of the military in political life
was again increased, constitutional amendment again made more difficult, the
presidential term increased from six to eight years, the Central Bank again
made more independent, and the transition period of the constitution extended
from five to eight years. In the final version the idea of an unelected
transitional parliament was rejected in favour of a succession plebiscite at the
end of the transition period. This succession plebiscite, planned for 1988,
would avoid a fully competitive presidential election. Simply, citizens would
vote for or against a junta-nominated presidential candidate (ie Pinochet). A
congressional parliamentary election was proposed for December 1989. A
full presidential election would take place only if the junta's candidate was
rejected in the 1988 succession plebiscite.
It can be seen from the last paragraph that one of the thrusts of the
junta's changes was to preserve the presidency in Pinochet's hands after 1988.
As we know, the attempt failed with the failure ofPinochet to win the 1988
succession referendum. It is worth recording that maintaining personal
presidential power had long been an ambition of Pinochet. His opening 1977
directive to the Constitutional Commission had included a curious device, that
of an indirectly elected president. The 1977 directive had been advice from
Pinochet in favour of a president elected not by popular suffrage, but indirectly
by Congress. The Constitutional Commission rejected the advice, proposed
the more conventional directly elected presidency, but also invented the idea
of the transitional period before a new constitution might take full effect.
The 1980 constitutional plebiscite was needed by the military
dictatorship to legitimate the new economic Chile created by the 1973 coup.
In 1973 the military had so far stepped beyond the bounds of the normal role
of the armed forces in Chile that popular approval was deemed necessary for
the new neoliberal society created on the back of repression. Opposition
forces, after hesitation, came to accept the plebiscite - practically though not
normatively. The !opposition, in Moulian's view, generally reached the
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conclusion that the constitutional proposals had generated such interest in the
population that a 'don't vote' campaign would be unsustainable. t6 Moreover,
campaigning for a 'no' vote rather than abstention would create valuable
political space that would allow further campaigning on fundamental issues.
Hence, the opposition, including the Communist Party, participated in the
plebiscite campaign. In 1980 the opposition lost; Pinochet's 'yes' campaign in
favour of the constitutional proposals won. The published result gave a 'yes'
vote of 67% to the junta, 30% to the opposition 'no' campaign. Evidence of
rigging of the outcome is irrefutable - voting by some traceable
subpopulations of the electorate was over] 00%.17
We turn now to the second negotiation of the present Chilean
constitution. This preceded the re-entry to congressional and presidential
elections. The 1980s saw growing internal opposition to the Pinochet regime,
and the General lost the 1988 succession plebiscite. This referendum,
designed to keep Pinochet in power until the late 1990s, in turn provoked
fresh constitutional negotiation. The opposition had come to accept the need
to maintain the 1980 Pinochet constitution - any promise to do away with it
was likely to convince the military to remain in power by force. The] 980
constitution made it easier to amend the constitution during the transitional
period than following full implementation. 18 The freshly victorious opposition
therefore had great interest in negotiating with the outgoing junta before the
conclusion of Pinochet's presidential term. Once fully implemented, the
constitution would require for any amendment the approval of both houses of
the Congress. Given the presence of unelected, appointed, senators in the
Senate, the achieving of a majority in favour of amendment would be difficult.
So, before the new constitution came into full effect, there was a second round
of constitutional negotiation.
In practice, this renegotiation was largely carried out between the
16
17
18
Moulian, op cit.
Moulian. op cil.
Article 116 of the constitution establishes the majority needed for a reform of the constitution. For
a constitutional reform a majority ofthree-fifths of senators and deputies is required. In practice,
therefore, Chile has acquired a rigid constitution since the composition of the Senate, with its un-
electcd designated senators dependent on and favourable to the legacy of dictatorship, militates
against any proposal achieving such a three-fifths majority.
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military government and Renovaci6n Nacional, a right-wing grouping highly
sympathetic to the Pinochet regime. 19 Renovaci6n Nacional saw that there
was a need to further legitimate the 1980 constitution by removing from it the
elements which were 'over-protective' of the interests of the military.
Renovaci6n Nacional indeed succeeded in persuading the military to modify
the constitution without deflecting the constitution from its fundamental
direction. The composition of the Senate was modified, the powers of the
Council of National Security changed, the autonomy of the armed forces
reduced. However, in essence, the thrust of the Pinochet constitution was
maintained. This thrust was to have an effective minority veto in Congress,
and to make impossible fundamental political and socio-economic changes
without broad political agreement. In the Senate the original balance of 26
elected to 10 unelected senators was changed in the constitutional settlement
of 1989 to 38 elected to nine unelected. Thus the likelihood of a largely
'blocking' Senate was reduced somewhat. The centre-left anti-Pinochet
coalition styled 'la Concertaci6n' accepted the modesty of the constitutional
changes negotiated by Renovaci6n Nacional. A plebiscite of 1989 massively
endorsed the adapted constitution. Since then the Concertaci6n grouping has
three times won the national congressional elections, the last general election
being in December 1997. By not challenging the political and economic
structures created by the military regime, the Concertaci6n has three times
won the right to administer the society created by Pinochet and the 1973 coup.
Key Article 19 of the Constitution
The above discussion of how the present Chilean constitution was
created indicates how little Pinochet was prepared to open up Chile in his
1980 constitution20 However, a new constitution was delivered in 1980, and
opposition forces used the constitutional referendum, and the provisions of the
constitution, as far as possible, to re-establish political life.
Article 19 of the Chilean constitution is a key part of the history and
nature of the recent changes in Chile. This article regulates the rights and
19
20
Moulian, op cit.
For instance, in the 1980 version of the constitution Pinochet envisaged appointing a full quarter
of the Senate. With this guaranteed base, the head of state needed the support of only three of the
elected senators in order to effectively control legislation.
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duties of citizens, including the rights to civil liberties. Among these is
number 7, concerning personal liberty and individual safety. The importance
of Article 19 is that it gives a constitutional protection to liberty, and gives
explicit expression to the conditions under which a citizen may lose liberty21
The Pinochet dictatorship's early years had been marked by unrestricted
and unregulated mass arrests, torture, disappearances and murder. The
inclusion of Article 19 in the constitution gave legal assistance to individual
liberty. It put for the first time during the Pinochet dictatorship some brake
on the torture and abuse practised by the security forces without any legal
impediment, and with complete impunity. Thanks to Article 19 some of the
arrests made after the Constitution of Liberty was promulgated were
combatted by the freedom provisions promised in the document. Gradually,
via appeal to Article 19, the regime of terror directed at opposition forces in
particular, and at the citizenry in general, was contained and reduced. Chile
in the 1980s was a much less murderous polity than in the period 1973-79.
Thus, Article 19 represents an important line of development in the evolution
of the dictatorship towards a formally democratic regime. Besides individual
liberty, Article 19 establishes a series offreedoms which permitted opposition
forces to use various areas of public freedom, and to begin overt criticism of
and opposition to the regime. So, for example, freedom of expression,
freedom to gather and freedom to engage in union activity were all
fundamental in this process of allowing gathering public opposition to the
Pinochet regime. Most important in all this was section 15 of Article 19,
regulating the right of association, and hence the right to organise a political
party. During the 1980s, within the constitutional framework established by
Pinochet, the opposition was allowed to create political organisations. It
should be remembered that by 1977 the coup abolished all conventional
political activity, including that of right-wing parties and factions - to the great
surprise and chagrin of conventional right-wing politicians who expected to
see themselves rapidly translated by the military to positions of power. This
21 Article 21 of the Chilean constitution provides for constitutional protection of the rights and
duties recognised in Article 19, establishing in paI1icuiar legal mechanisms to be used in the case
of violations of individual freedoms. It is important to point out that this Article 21 provides
Habeas Corpus for the protection of the individual. This proved to be a most imp0l1ant brake on
thc illegal violence and disappearances, With the implementation of the constitution this Article
21 became in the I980s one of the fundamental tools available to opposition groups in hmdering
aI'bitrary actions by the regime against its own citizens.
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translation did not occur. 22 The military gathered political power to itself.
However, section 15 of Article 19 allowed the creation of political bodies,
many of them reproducing bodies formerly well established in the political
history of the country. For instance, the Christian Democratic Party re-
emerged, and has continued to playa key political role in Chile in the 1990s.
During the 1980s, unlike the 1970s in Chile, opposition to the regime could
be both frontal and constitutional, and recognised as such by the regime. This
in turn re-socialised citizens into the dynamic ofconventional political activity
and the dynamic of having openly conflictual currents of thought within the
country. The early Pinochet regime had, in contrast, been a totalitarian state,
complete with conc;entration camps, mass murder, routine terror and
repression (eg curfews), direct military control of mass communications, and
the prohibition of the political parties.
Laissez-faire economic policy is written into the Chilean constitution.
Article 19, section 21, of the constitution regulates economic freedoms, and
within this establishes the framework of the state's economic activity. It is a
key part of the Constitution of Liberty since it embodies constitutionally the
minimal role accorded to state intervention in economic affairs. This
intervention is to take place within, and to be regulated within, the very same
framework as that of individuals. The state's economic activity will be of the
same general character as that of individual citizens or legal persons. With
this provision is created a prohibition on the state of maintaining and
developing economic activities in protected or monopolistic areas of activity.
Most fundamentally, this part ofthe constitution establishes that the state will
intervene in economic life merely as one more individual. In sum, the
physically totalitarian state developed a sketchily democratic state (the new
constitution) that provided for an economically minimalist state. In the 1990s
that economically minimalist state has survived the crude forms of the
dictatorship which generated it.
The influence of Hayek and Friedman in all this is clear, and
continuing. The democratic Chile of the 1990s has not reversed the economic
philosophies embedded constitutionally in the political system established by
Pinochet in 1980-81. The next section below explains how, too, the structure
of the Congress militates against constitutional change. In short, the Pinochet
22 For a fictional, but barely fictional, account of attitudes to the coup in the Chilean political class
see Isabel Allende's novel, (1994), The House ofthe Spirits, Black Swan, London
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constitution of 1980 was carefully prepared in order to make the retreat from
neoliberallaissez-faire difficult and unlikely.
The economic importance of Article 19 is that, above all, it establishes
by constitutional guarantee the economic system within which the state is to
operate. Thus, strategic economic change, at the level of general system
reform, is removed from the democratic decision-making. This article must
be considered as one of the fundamental legacies ofPinochet to post-Pinochet
Chile. Article 19 establishes the fundamental economic character of the
nation as a fundamental constitutional point - unlike in Britain, for instance,
where neoliberal strategies are embedded in government policies, not in
constitutional arrangements. The success of the Pinochet regime has been in
creating an economic revolution that can only be reversed by constitutional
reform, a reform made unlikely by the electoral and legislative arrangements
developed in the 1980 constitution, and passed (with limited modification) to
the 1990s. (See paragraphs on Article 45, below.)
Congressional form: The two chambers and a 'life senator'
The Chilean parliament has two chambers, carefully designed by the
constitution to produce stalemate on radical proposals - ie to protect the status
quo.
The composition of the Chilean Senate, the upper chamber of Congress,
is dealt with by Article 45 of the constitution. Traditionally in Chile, the
Senate had been an elected body. Pinochet's 1980 constitution introduced for
the first time 'designated', non-elected senators. Although their number was
reduced (from the number desired by Pinochet) in the constitutional reforms
that followed Pinochet's defeat in the 1988 plebiscite, designated senators
remain a key feature of the Chilean constitution. Pinochet's invention of
designated senators gave non-elected entry to the Senate to former presidents
of the republic, former ministers, heads of the armed forces. Former
presidents in particular were to enjoy an almost automatic right to a lifetime
senatorship. This clearly gave Pinochet a straightforward escape route. Once
his military term of office expired he could go on to be a life senator. With
this new role would come, crucially, permanent legal immunity since Article
58 of the constitution provides for the freedom from external prosecution of
senators during their office.
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In early 1998 Pinochet did indeed retire as commander in chief of the
armed forces, and he immediately took his seat as a life senator in the
Congress. Constitutionally this was an interesting manoeuvre, successfully
accomplished. Ironically, Pinochet had not been elected to the presidency by
any proper democratic process, and indeed he had deposed the last properly
elected president, Allende. With similar irony, Pinochet entered a democratic
congress although he had abolished parliamentary democracy in 1973. The
manoeuvre is interesting partly because the translation from army to Congress
shows the foresight with which Pinochet's advisors created the present legal
framework. In a sense, Pinochet needed to become a life senator in order to
protect himself from possible attempts in the courts to prosecute him for
human rights abuses. 23 The present constitution conveniently prevents the
prosecution of senators except via impeachment from within the Senate itself.
The construction of the balance of forces within the Senate (eg the presence
of 'designated' senators representing the armed forces) makes such
impeachment highly unlikely. The Senate is therefore a place of safety for
Pinochet, as well as a place of continued influence. However, it was
important, in order to avoid a human rights prosecution, for Pinochet to enter
the Senate on the very day on which he stepped down from the armed forces.
And it was in exactly this way that he took his seat for life.
Article 45 (composition of the Senate) and Article 58 (relative immunity
of senators from prosecution) in combination represent a marked break with
the democratic tradition of the organs of the state. More than this, however,
the constitution, even as amended into its present form after the 1988
plebiscite, created a Senate that has been and remains an effective block on the
passing ofany legislation which might tend to reform fundamental aspects of
the polity created by the dictatorship. Pinochet has been granted a presence
23 The immunity position is rather complex. In 1978 Pinochet granted himself, and other military,
immunity from prosecution for any crimes committed during and after the coup. However, in late
November 1998, following Pinochet' s detention in London at the request of the Spanish
investigatmg magistrate Garzon, the Chilean foreign minister reported that there were 14
outstanding complaints against Pinochet on file with Chilean investigating magistrates. Despite
the immunity law of 1978, and to deflect attention from himself, Pinochet finally tolerated the
prosecution of his former head of the DINA secret police. DINA had reported directly to the
President Previously, Pinochet had vetoed the extradition of Contreras to the USA to be
prosecuted for the murder ofLetelier in that country. Contreras was finally convicted and
imprisoned in Chile. Even in the event that this precedent or other arguments could produce a
prosecution of Pinochet within Chile, he retains the right to appear before a military tribunal. It is
very unlikely that a military tribunal would ever convict him.
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for life in the politics of Chile, and at the same time effective personal legal
immunity. 24
A brief description of the composition of the lower chamber of
parliament is useful for us, too. The lower chamber of the parliament is fully
elected. However, by design of the constitution, the lower chamber has quirks
of composition that tend to produce political stalemate, and thence legislative
stagnation. In the contemporary Chilean electoral system parties normally
offer two candidates in each constituency, there being two deputies elected for
each constituency. However, it is extremely unlikely that any party will have
in practice two candidates elected for a single constituency. Where any party,
Party X, wins the first deputy position, in order also to win the second seat,
it must gain for its second candidate more than twice the votes of the
candidate, from Party Y or Z, who takes third position. Such large majorities
for the second seat are very unusual. Understandably, the two deputies for any
constituency therefore tend to come from different and opposing parties. The
result is therefore a lower house where no one party dominates, and a lower
house little subject to changes of political composition over the successive
elections of the 1990s. The Pinochet constitution has produced a
neutralisation in advance of radical legislation.
Legacies and the Transition
The Pinochet regime has left two major joint legacies to Chile. First,
the neoliberal economic policies created in the mid 1970s have remained
practically unquestioned during the 1990s. Parties that opposed Pinochet, and
then formed the democratic governments, have not been consistent in
opposition to the neoliberal privatisation policies of the dictatorship. The
basic neoliberallaissez-jaire orientation of the Chilean economy remains as
before - the state interventionism of Allende's Popular Unity government has
never returned to the practical political agenda, despite the fact that the
Socialist Party is central to coalition government.
Second, the political constitution of Chile remains one essentially
created by the dictatorship to reproduce, within democracy, the social
arrangements imposed under dictatorship. Simply, the Pinochet constitution
24 See the same conclusion reached in The Economist, 5 December 1998, pp 71-72
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is a constitution of checks and balances where any party finds it difficult to
achieve a majority in Congress. The upper chamber, Senate, has those
appointed (unelected) 'designated senators' representing the four branches of
the armed forces. The voting system, Senate's composition, and constitutional
relationships between the executive and the two chambers (not explored in this
article) all contribute to a system in which controversial economic and
constitutional reforms are unlikely. This is what the Pinochet regime wished -
having radically transformed Chilean society, the regime ensured that return
to democracy would not favour return to opposing economic policies.
Such was the situation largely until Pinochet's detention. Pinochet's
arrest in London in October 1998 provoked in Chile the resurgence of
majority political demands, demands still unsatisfied by the long period of
transition in Chilean politics during the 1990s. The General's arrest brought
back to the public agenda the need to bring to a conclusion various themes
largely neglected during the transition to formal democracy. It has become
clear that a majority of the population remained unhappy with the treatment
given during the transition to certain key topics, most importantly those of
justice and human rights. Public unhappiness has centred on the need for the
establishment of responsibility for the mass murders, disappearances and
torture during the Pinochet years. Also, there has been unhappiness, now
manifest, over the political arrangements inherited by Chile via the
constitutional framework created by the dictatorship. Most obviously, given
the lack of precedent in Chile, there has been growing opposition to
Pinochet's life senatorship and to the existence of designated (unelected)
senators.
These unresolved issues (justice, human rights, political arrangements)
would not have acquired the importance and energy they now have if Pinochet
had not been detained in London in late 1998. The event gave rise to reborn
hopes, demonstrating that the legal and constitutional themes had been latent
issues all through the transition (ie from 1989 onwards). It can be claimed
that the majority support for Pinochet's prosecution25 indicates majority
disapproval for the course traced by the transition with regard to these issues.
This last claim is supported by the high rate of abstention recorded in national
25 See The Economist, op cit. In late 1998 polls indicated that nearly two-thirds (60-62%) of
Chileans were in favour ofPinochet's prosecution for human rights violations, and that about
50% of Chileans were for the prosecution of Pinochet in another jmisdiction.
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elections, particularly the general election of late 1997. High abstention is
historically very unusual in Chile, traditionally a deeply politicised country,
and this mass abstention has explicitly worried political circles.26
Pinochet's arrest has made clear that the transition in Chile, like the
transition into democracy in many nations, has involved political
compromises, compromises that have left unresolved themes which are quite
crucial if citizens are to live together productively and cohesively. The
compromises reached between Pinochet and the Concertaci6n coalition that
has ruled during the 1990s have left widespread frustration among the
citizenry with regard to the promises ofjustice and of political change. These
promises are regarded as having been broken by the political class,27 a class
which in recent years has made little effort to modifY the political and social
legacy of Pinochet.
Without the arrest of Pinochet and the obvious interest within certain
European jurisdictions to achieve some justice in relation to Chile, the
resurgence of political agitation would not have occurred. Withol't this arrest,
the transition would have continued along its 'normal' course. The human
rights issue, we can claim, would have remained latent, both politically and
judicially. Pinochet's life senatorship and the institution of the designated
senators would have continued relatively untroubled. 28
Pinochet's arrest has therefore revealed something of the nature of the
Chilean transition towards democracy, and gives us the opportunity to
comment on the general theoretical ideas surrounding such political
transitions. With the collapse of the Soviet block, theories of transition from
authoritarian to democratic regimes have become more closely debated.
There are two major theoretical currents which claim to explain political
transitions, their successes and failures.
On one side we have what might be termed 'cultural theories' which in
general terms argue that political transitions of this type are successful to the
extent that they answer to popular political and social aspirations. Only in the
26
27
28
See. for example, issues of the daily paper EI Mercurio (Santiago) in the closing weeks of 1997.
That there is a 'political class' in Chile can be seen in the repetition in positions of political and
business power of certain family names. The present President Frei, for instance, is from a
younger generation of the Frei family which produced the President Frei of the 1960s.
Demonstrations against Pinochet's investiture as life senator in March 1998 were very muted.
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measure that compromises and agreements represent and express general
wishes, are those agreements, and thus political transitions from dictatorship
to democracy, successful. In this version, success is dependent not on the
mere existence ofcompromises and agreements between elites, but also on the
inherited political culture more general within the citizenry.
On the other side, what we might term 'pact theories' maintain that
transitions are successful where rival political elites can arrive at agreements
and compromises on fundamental issues which allow them to stabilize the
country, keeping contained 'excessive' popular demands that might provoke
instability in the nation. In this view, elite groupings reach compromise
agreements among one another, agreements that allow the elites to co-exist
without major upset or difficulty. Excessive reform zeal from below is kept
under control. It is the interests of the political elites which are best served
by the transition.
The popular reaction to Pinochet's arrest in Europe indicates the
existence of demands and aspirations long unfulfilled within Chile. The
current unrest against Pinochet, lacking a military response, also demonstrates
that - despite threats from certain sectors - the Chilean transition has never
been in danger from a second coup d'etat. Neither internal nor international
conditions have existed to foster and support such a repeat coup.
The recent history of Chile accords better with a 'pact theory'
interpretation of transition The democratic transition in Chile was a transition
in which the escape back to democracy sacrificed issues of justice and
democracy that are of great importance to the majority. The sacrifice was
managed on the back of a political blackmail that evoked the ghosts of civil
war, coup, or general social and economic chaos. Quite simply, the message
was that the modified Pinochet constitution was the best reasonably available
if the country wished to remove Pinochet without fear of active military
resentment. Until now, the political elite groupings have pacted between one
another not to pursue the outstanding matters of human rights and
responsibility. They have done this in the interests of a new stable political
system in which they retained great influence (Pinochet and the military) or
else gained great influence (the coalition Concertaci6n government). The
supposed consequence of pursuing the former dictator was renewed violence
and chaos. These elites have so far succeeded in containing the social
demands still deeply rooted in public consciousness.
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The 25 years ofPinochet's domination of Chile are not over. While the
Pinochet constitution remains in place, the laissez-faire society generated by
the dictatorship is likely to survive. Pinochet may have stepped down from
presidency and army, but the Pinochet society is still working, constitutionally
protected. The question now is to what extent the post-arrest militancy will
lead to a general revision of the economy and state.
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